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INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario: soon after an employee begins a new job,
her coworkers proposition her for sexual favors and make lewd and sexist jokes
around her. The employee believes she is being sexually harassed and informs
her supervisor of the behavior. Soon afterward, her working environment
changes for the worse: her coworkers sabotage her workspace, scratch her car,
and refuse to provide her with routine job assistance. Ultimately, she resigns
and files a suit under Title VII, claiming sex-based hostile work environment
harassment and unlawful retaliation.
Data from social science studies and statistics from the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) suggest that scenarios like this one-where
a plaintiff experiences harassment alongside retaliation-are pervasive. Yet
courts have not reached a consensus about how to conceptualize such
situations. One response has been to disaggregate the situation into two
separate claims, treating the precomplaint behavior as constituting sex
harassment and considering the postcomplaint behavior as constituting
retaliation alone. Alternatively, some courts have understood the entire set of
behavior as hostile work environment harassment, with postcomplaint
behavior understood as escalated harassment, retaliation, or both.
Courts often draw distinctions between the claims without sufficiently
examining why the doctrinal boundaries have been drawn the way they have.
Fragmented understandings of harassment and discrimination in turn
undermine the potential of the two claims to redress discrimination by
misconstruing or failing to recognize how discriminatory dynamics operate in
the workplace. The lack of judicial consensus over joint claims extends to the
basic legal elements of retaliation and harassment, such as causation,
evidentiary burdens, and employer liability, and results in part from the
absence of a coherent framework for understanding retaliation and harassment
when they occur together. This gap is evident in scholarship as well. While
hostile work environment harassment' and retaliation2 have each received
1. For discussions of how the hostile work environment claim can address exclusion, see, for
example, Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REv. 625 (2005)
(discussing work culture as a source of discrimination); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1164 (1995) (discussing the ways in which "subtle or
unconscious race and national origin discrimination" lead to exclusion); Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998) (focusing on hostile work
environment claims based on sex); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 1O COLUM. L. REv. 458 (2001); and Noah D. Zatz,
Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J.
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considerable academic attention in their own right (harassment more so than
retaliation), little research has been done into how they operate-and how they
should be understood-when they occur in concert.
This Note seeks to bridge some of the gap in the literature. It argues that
joint claims of hostile work environment harassment and retaliation have the
potential to allow courts to redress dynamic forms of exclusion in the
workplace, because each claim focuses upon a distinct type of harm. The
harassment inquiry focuses on why and how individuals were singled out for
adverse treatment, and asks whether such treatment hinders an individual's
ability to pursue her work because of a protected characteristic. The retaliation
inquiry, by contrast, focuses upon the conduct of a person in opposing
discrimination, and asks whether the actions of the employer or coworkers
could function to suppress an employee's oppositional behavior. When both
claims are brought together, courts have the opportunity to recognize dynamic
interactions between conduct-based and status-based forms of exclusion in the
workplace. This potential has been largely unrealized, however, due to courts'
failure to recognize harassment and retaliation as distinct, yet overlapping,
forms of behavior.
Part I demonstrates the need for research into the joint harassment and
retaliation claim by drawing on social science research and case law that
illustrates how harassment and retaliation commonly interact in the workplace.
I contend not only that harassment and retaliation frequently occur together,
but also that they interact to shape how an individual experiences
discrimination. Ongoing harassment coupled with retaliation serves not only
to exclude members of protected groups who have already experienced
discrimination, but also to punish them for daring to challenge their relegation
to the margins of the workplace. I then discuss how the distinct legal inquiries
of the harassment and retaliation claims, when employed in concert, hold the
potential to address patterns of exclusion that neither claim can reach alone.
Part II surveys how appellate courts have addressed joint
harassment/retaliation claims and offers three case studies to identify trends in
court treatment of such claims. Part II identifies a number of ways that courts
63, 65 (2002) (discussing the "growing understanding of how co-worker behavior and
shop- and office-level work culture act as agents of inequality, even as the battle against
employment discrimination shifts from overt, top-down forms to equally pervasive but
often subtle practices").
2. For discussions of the retaliation claim, see, for example, Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 9o
MINN. L. REv. 18 (2005); Douglas E. Ray, Title VII Retaliation Cases: Creating a New
Protected Class, 58 U. PITT. L. REv. 405, 413-16 (1997); and Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities:
Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529 (2003).
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have disaggregated behavior understood as retaliatory from behavior
understood as discriminatory in a way that unjustifiably narrows the reach of
each claim. I also discuss application of the Burlington Industries v. Ellerth3
"affirmative defense" to cases of retaliatory harassment. Applying Ellerth allows
employers to escape liability if they can show that they neither "knew nor
should have known" about the retaliation, or that they took reasonable
measures to remedy it.4 I critique the application of the Ellerth defense in light
of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White,' which indicated that retaliation plaintiffs arguably
deserve greater protection than even discrimination plaintiffs under Title VII. I
then discuss additional consequences of court disaggregation of the claims on
tolling and damages.
Part III discusses doctrinal ways to realize the potential of the joint
harassment and retaliation claims. Through a case study of an integrated claim,
Part III outlines how courts can conceptualize joint claims in a way that more
fully realizes how retaliation and harassment interact in the workplace. This
Note concludes with specific recommendations for how courts can understand
status-based and conduct-based forms of exclusion in an integrated way.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HARASSMENT AND RETALIATION
Harassment and retaliation are closely related. Retaliation not only often
accompanies harassment, but it also affects how individuals respond to
harassment. On one level, retaliation or threat of retaliation minimizes assertive
responses to discrimination, causing targets of harassment to choose not to
confront harassers, not to report harassment, or not to file discrimination
claims. On another level, retaliation works to underscore and amplify the
effects of harassment: it further excludes the target of harassment, while also
punishing her for attempting to challenge discriminatory behavior. This Part
assesses how retaliation and harassment commonly interact in the workplace.
3. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
4. Specifically, the Court in Ellerth held that in cases of hostile work environment harassment
that did not culminate in a "tangible" employment action-such as "discharge, demotion, or
undesirable reassignment" - employers can escape liability if they can demonstrate two
elements: "(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise." Id. at 765. This decision applied to discriminatory harassment, not
retaliatory harassment.
5. 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
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It then turns to the legal regimes of the harassment and retaliation claims.
Although retaliation and harassment frequently occur in tandem, they are
addressed under distinct and nonoverlapping doctrinal frameworks. The
retaliation inquiry focuses on the individual's conduct in opposing
discrimination, while the harassment inquiry focuses on whether an individual
was targeted for discrimination on the basis of her membership in a protected
class. Because each claim involves a distinct inquiry, the joint application of
these two inquiries holds potential to allow courts to understand how status-
and conduct-based forms of exclusion can operate simultaneously to maintain
and police discriminatory norms in the workplace.
A. Why Study Harassment and Retaliation Together?
Retaliation relates to harassment on a number of levels. First, the threat of
retaliation discourages employees from confronting harassment. According to
one study, an estimated seventy percent of sexual harassment victims who do
not file discrimination claims cite fear of retaliation as a "moderate or strong
influence on their decision" not to report the harassment.6 The threat of
retaliation deters even those employees who profess a strong belief in the
importance of preventing harassment from confronting it when faced with it
themselves, largely because of their belief that confronting or reporting
harassment can come at a high professional price. 7 Unfortunately, this
perception turns out to be correct much of the time. A number of social science
studies have found not only that confronting discrimination carries penalties in
the workplace, but also that the most assertive responses to harassment -such
as filing formal discrimination claims about the behavior -incur the strongest
6. Ellen R. Peirce, Benson Rosen & Tammy Bunn Hiller, Breaking the Silence: Creating User-
Friendly Sexual Harassment Policies, io EMP. RESPS. & RTs. J. 225, 233 tbl.II (1997).
7. One study illustrated this phenomenon by asking college-aged women how likely they
would be to confront discrimination in the form of blatantly sexist comments during a job
interview and then comparing their responses to those of other subjects actually asked the
same questions during an interview. The majority of the participants indicated they would
confront the behavior when asked how they would respond in the abstract, but when other
participants were actually asked the sexist questions in a simulated interview, fewer than
half of the participants challenged the comments in any way. Janet K. Swim & Lauri L.
Hyers, Excuse Me- What Did You Just Say?!: Women's Public and Private Responses to Sexist
Remarks, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 68, 82 tbl. 3 (1999).
While the discrepancy between the subjects' hypothetical responses and their actual
behaviors can be attributed to a number of impulses -ranging from fear of being denied the
job to fear of offending a potential employer -their silence can be understood to reflect "an
acute awareness of the social costs of confronting discrimination, rather than an acceptance
of the situation." Brake, supra note 2, at 31.
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backlash, with retaliation in the form of negative job evaluations, loss of
promotions, adverse transfers, and terminations.8 According to one study, one-
third of victims who filed formal claims about harassment reported that it
actually "made things worse" for them on the job.9 As a result of these
dynamics, few victims of harassment confront the behavior directly, choosing
instead to engage in passive tactics such as avoiding the harasser or ignoring
the harassment."l Only one percent of all targets of harassment choose the
most assertive response and actually file a claim of discrimination in court."
In addition to tangible forms of retaliation, such as adverse transfers or
demotions, those who speak out about discrimination face a social cost in the
workplace as well. In her recent article on retaliation, Deborah Brake discusses
a series of social studies demonstrating that women who confront coworkers
who make sexist comments, or even complain about sexism to others, incur
more of a social penalty than women who ignore sexism when it occurs.' 2
Individuals are stigmatized even when they simply express a belief that
discrimination has occurred in their workplace, but take no measures to report
or otherwise address the discrimination. Social psychologists Cheryl Kaiser and
Carol Miller illustrated this phenomenon through a study that assessed how
test subjects characterized African Americans based solely on the African
Americans' responses to failing a career test. They found that African
Americans who attributed their failure to racism were much more likely to be
described as "hypersensitive, emotional, argumentative, irritating, trouble
making, and complaining" by the test subjects than the African Americans who
blamed themselves for the poor result. 3 This result persisted even when the
subjects were shown "persuasive evidence of discrimination" in the way that
the tests had been graded.
1 4
This finding-that those who speak out about the possibility of
discrimination encounter strong social stigma, even when they do not report or
8. See Louise F. Fitzgerald, Suzanne Swan & Karla Fischer,Why Didn't She Just Report Him?
The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. Soc.
ISSUES 117, 122 (1995).
9. Id. at 123.
lo. Id. at 119-20.
ii. Id. at 123.
12. Brake, supra note 2, at 32-35 ("A disturbing body of research demonstrate[s] a high
propensity for men and white persons to dislike women and people of color when they claim
discrimination, even when the claim is meritorious.").
13. Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of Making Attributions
to Discrimination, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 254, 261 (2001).
14. Id. at 258; see also Brake, supra note 2, at 32-33.
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otherwise act to address the discrimination -is particularly disturbing because
it indicates that members of groups most likely to experience discrimination
are also likely to face retaliation if they speak out. In other words, not only do
members of excluded groups face a greater likelihood of being discriminated
against in the first place, but they experience high social costs when they report
that discrimination as well."5
The threat of retaliation not only discourages individuals from reporting
harassment, but also delays them from speaking out. Of the small minority of
harassment victims who actually file a claim, only about ten percent do so
while employed. 6 The delay in reporting discrimination likely stems from the
perception that confronting harassment is risky, and that it is safer to wait until
there is relatively little to lose before speaking out. But victims of employment
discrimination do, in fact, have much to lose by waiting to report
discrimination. First, some employees may be unable to leave a discriminatory
workplace and may therefore be forced to endure harassment indefinitely. This
not only creates a cost for the individual victim, but also undermines the
effectiveness of Title VII, which principally relies on individuals to bring
private suits for enforcement.1 7 Second, the delay in reporting discrimination
has feedback effects within the workplace. Employees who witness
discriminatory behavior go undisciplined may conclude that challenging
discrimination is futile, and therefore may be discouraged from filing claims
for themselves in the future.'8 Delays in reporting discrimination also reduce
the cost of discrimination for employers. The employer realizes the "benefit" of
is. Kaiser & Miller, supra note 13, at 259.
16. John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 STAN. L. Rav. 983, 1031 (1991). Donohue and Siegelman also discuss the fact
that most Tide VII plaintiffs have been discharged by their employer. Id. Thus, while it
could be the case that employees quit in response to harassment and then immediately bring
discrimination claims, data suggest instead that most employees who bring discrimination
claims are involuntarily terminated before they file suit, thereby resulting in a time lag
between the start of the harassment and the filing of the discrimination suit.
17. See, e.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1o57, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Title VII ... depends
almost entirely upon individual workers-private attorneys general-to achieve the
deterrent purposes of the statute.").
is. See Holt v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 708 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1983) ("A retaliatory discharge
carries with it the distinct risk that other employees may be deterred from protecting their
rights under the Act or from providing testimony for the plaintiff in her effort to protect her
own rights.").
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discrimination immediately, but delays the cost of discrimination to a remote
and uncertain point in the future.' 9
Third, delayed claims may become time barred. Title VII states that a
plaintiff shall file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within either 18o
or 300 days after an "alleged unlawful employment practice occurred."2" The
Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean that a plaintiff only has
a viable cause of action for "discrete acts" of discrimination that occurred
within the tolling period.' For a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff
must show that at least one act contributing to the ongoing hostile work
environment occurred within the mandated period.2 Given this strict
enforcement of Title VII's tolling period, plaintiffs who delay reporting
discrimination run the risk of permanently losing their chance for legal redress.
Retaliation and the threat of retaliation not only discourage employees
from reporting harassment, but also affect the way they experience harassment.
While retaliation is often characterized as motivated by an individual's conduct
in opposing discrimination, and harassment and other forms of discrimination
are understood as motivated by an individual's status as a member of a
protected class,23 these two types of behaviors are not as distinct as they may
initially appear. Employees can be and frequently are simultaneously targeted
for exclusion both because of who they are and because of what they do. In this
19. By "benefit," I refer generally to any utility that an employer with discriminatory preferences
may derive from realizing those preferences through the composition of a hierarchical or
segregated workforce. Cf Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 16, at io24 ("If the employer
feels animus towards women or minorities, he must in addition [to the costs of paying the
worker] bear some psychological costs of associating with the worker.") Conversely, this
also suggests that such an employer would realize some psychological benefit from
discriminating against women or minorities. There is also literature that suggests that
antidiscrimination laws reduce economic efficiency. Cf, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992)
(arguing that antidiscrimination laws are economically inefficient because they violate
freedom of contract principles).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000).
21. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002); see also Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire, 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 (2007) ("The EEOC charging period is triggered when
a discrete unlawful practice takes place.").
22. Morgan, 356 U.S. at 117.
23. The Supreme Court, for instance, has described the relationship between the harassment
provision (or, more broadly, the antidiscrimination provision) of Title VII and the
retaliation provision as follows: "The substantive provision seeks to prevent injury to
individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to
prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct." Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412 (2006).
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sense, retaliation can work to underscore and amplify the effects of the
harassment from the perspective of the target employee, while also deterring
the target of the exclusionary behavior from challenging the discriminatory
treatment.
This relationship does not lend itself as easily to empirical analysis, but can
nonetheless be observed through studies of workplace dynamics or in cases
where employers transparently reveal their motivations for harassing and
retaliatory behavior. Such studies reveal harassment as often motivated by the
desire to preserve a gender- or race-dominated work hierarchy, as well as the
identities of those who engage in it.'4 Cynthia Cockburn offers one depiction of
this dynamic through a large-scale, interview-based analysis of technologically
based fields. Cockburn describes enclaves of predominantly male technicians
who deliberately create a work environment premised upon a gender-based
hierarchy, and then maintain that hierarchy through harassment and the threat
of retaliation." Cockburn describes the male technicians relating to each other
through
competitive swearing and obscenity and a trade in sexual stories,
references and innuendo that are directly objectifying and exploitative
of women. It serves the purpose of forging solidarity between them.
Some men told me frankly that, yes, a woman there, it does cramp your
style and spoil the conviviality. The obscenity creates a boundary across
which the women will fear to step. A maintenance technician told me,
"If someone [i.e. some woman] came into this set-up they would have
to accept it and not try to change it."
2 6
The male workers embrace a culture premised upon excluding women in order
to reinforce their belief that the technician pool is an appropriately all-male
enclave. The work culture then is employed as a way to justify the exclusion of
women. 7 The technician's warning that a woman entering the technician pool
would "have to accept it and not try to change it" suggests how the threat of
retaliation can be used to silence those who would resist their relegation to the
24. See Schultz, supra note I, at 1755 & n.387 (citing this theory and discussing social science
evidence in support of it).
25. CYNTHIA COCKBURN, MACHINERY OF DOMINANCE: WOMEN, MEN, AND TECHNICAL KNOW-
HOW 175-76 (1988).
a6. Id. at 176.
27. See also Schultz, supra note I, at 1691 ("Harassment serves a gender-guarding, competence-
undermining function: By subverting women's capacity to perform favored lines of work,
harassment polices the boundaries of the work and protects its idealized masculine image -
as well as the identity of those who do it.").
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bottom of gender-based work hierarchies. It suggests that although a woman
would be unwelcome in the pool simply because of her status as a woman, she
would be more likely to be tolerated if she herself tolerated the discriminatory
atmosphere. If she spoke out, not only would she be forced to endure the
discriminatory environment, but she could also become the target of retaliatory
behavior designed to further marginalize her and maintain the exclusionary
workplace norms.
Harassment and retaliation can interrelate in far more overt ways to
exclude members of protected groups. An example of how retaliation can
magnify and reinforce discrimination occurs in Slack v. Havens, 8 where four
African American women were ordered to do heavy cleaning work that was not
in their job description. Their supervisor justified the assignment under the
rationale that "[c]olored folks are hired to clean because they clean better. 29 As
their supervisor's comment indicates, the women were targeted for the
discriminatory assignment as a result of their membership in a low-status caste
within the workplace. Because of their identities as African Americans, they
were perceived as better suited to perform heavy cleaning than whites, and, by
implication, not as well suited to perform the work for which they actually had
been hired. When the women protested the assignment, they were told to
perform the work "or else."3° After they persisted in their opposition, the
plaintiffs were terminated and told that "[c]olored people should stay in their
places."3' The discrimination in this instance resulted from the supervisor's
caste-like understanding of what kinds of jobs "colored" people were fit to
perform, as well as stereotypes about how members of the group ought to
behave. By refusing to accept both the discriminatory assignment as well as the
order to "stay in their places," the women became the targets of additional
exclusionary behavior. The retaliatory action amplified the effects of the
discrimination by imposing an additional penalty- termination from
employment -because the plaintiffs refused to conform to racial stereotypes,
accept a discriminatory work assignment, and act in accordance with their
supervisor's racist (and possibly sexist) views that African American women
are naturally better suited to do heavy cleaning.
Because retaliation and harassment so commonly interact in the workplace,
plaintiffs frequently bring harassment and retaliation charges together. Today,
28. 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 885 (S.D. Cal. 1973), affd as modified, 522 F.2d 1O91 ( 9th Cir.
1975).
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the retaliation claim is one of the most common claims brought under Title
VII.32 Since 1997, charges of retaliation under Title VII have increased by nearly
twenty percent, and by 2006, over a quarter of all complaints filed with the
EEOC alleged retaliation.33 While it is hard to determine accurately how often
retaliation claims are brought alongside harassment claims in particular,
existing data indicate that there is a high correlation. A recent empirical study
estimates that nearly half of the claimants in racial harassment cases also bring
retaliation claims. 4 Research into sexual harassment suggests a similarly
strong correlation, with one survey finding that sixty-two percent of women
who reported sexual harassment -both through internal grievance procedures
and by filing claims- also reported retaliation."
Given the frequency with which harassment and retaliation accompany
each other, and the precipitous rise in retaliation claims overall in the last
fifteen years, there is an increasingly urgent need for a systemic response by
courts to joint harassment/retaliation claims.
B. The Legal Regimes of the Claims
Although retaliation and hostile work environment harassment frequently
occur in concert, they are addressed under distinct legal frameworks. 6 Hostile
work environment harassment is governed by section 703(a)(1) of Title VII,
which makes it unlawful for an employer
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.37
To succeed in a claim for hostile work environment harassment, a plaintiff is
required to prove as a threshold matter that: (i) the discrimination has been
32. U.S. Equal Opportunity Comm'n, Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2006 (Feb. 26,
2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (indicating that retaliation
charges are exceeded in frequency only by charges of sex and race discrimination).
33. Id.
34. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Unwrapping Racial Harassment Law, 27 BERKELEYJ. EMP. &
LAB. L. 49, 8o (2006).
35. Fitzgerald et al., supra note 8, at 122.
36. See Brake, supra note 2, at 46-51 (discussing how the retaliation inquiry differs from the
discrimination inquiry).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
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"sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of... employment and
create an abusive working environment"'' 8 and (2) the discrimination is based
upon the "individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."39 Both of
these requirements pose substantial hurdles for plaintiffs. The "severe or
pervasive" prong requires courts to engage in detailed, fact-specific
examinations of how frequently discriminatory conduct occurred. If a court
finds that the harassment occurred only sporadically, or that it was regular but
trivial in nature, the plaintiff cannot establish a hostile work environment
claim.4" The requirement that a plaintiff prove the discrimination occurred
because of membership in a protected group can also be difficult to satisfy. In
the case of sex-based harassment, for instance, the Supreme Court has stressed
the importance of evidence of sexual desire on the part of the harasser and
evidence that the harassment included "sex-specific and derogatory terms."4"
Because of the emphasis on sexist or sexualized commentary as well as sexual
contact, plaintiffs who lack this kind of anecdotal evidence have difficulty
establishing that the discrimination occurred because of sex. 42 In particular,
women (or men) who are harassed because of their sex in less overtly sexual
ways -such as through the denial of access to training opportunities, sabotaged
work, exclusion from networking opportunities, or the denial of routine job
privileges -often face more difficulty in proving their case than those who are
harassed in explicitly sexual terms.43 Similar trends occur in race-based cases,
where judges stress the need for evidence in the form of race-specific
derogatory language. 44
38. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-2(a)(1) (2000).
40. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002).
41. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 8o (1998). For one critique of the Oncale
paradigm, see Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 1, 23-26 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B.
Siegel eds., 2004), which argues that the Oncae paradigm, in which sexual harassment is
understood as motivated either by "desire" or by "hostility to women in the workplace," has
the potential to obscure as much as it illuminates.
42. See generally Schultz, supra note 1 (discussing sex-based harassment as action that takes
many different forms, many of which are not predominantly sexual).
43. Id. at 1687.
44. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 34, at 87 (analyzing survey results showing that outcomes in
racial discrimination cases vary depending on the type of harassment, and explaining that
'when defendants use ostensibly race-linked physical objects (such as nooses or Ku Klux
Klan-associated attire) (33.3% success rate) or race-obvious verbal harassment (such as the
use of'nigger') (25.9%), plaintiffs are more likely to win than the average").
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In sexual harassment claims only, plaintiffs also face the additional burden
of showing that the harassment was "unwelcome," at least when the conduct
consists of sexual advances. 4' Because of this complicated framework, plaintiffs
who experience a hostile work environment often face difficulty proving that
harassment occurred because of a protected characteristic, rather than because
of factors such as pure personal animus.46
As briefly noted above, plaintiffs in harassment claims must prove an
additional element in order to establish employer liability. Burlington Industries
v. Ellerth47 established a special liability scheme in the case of hostile work
environment harassment where the harassment is perpetrated by a supervisor
and does not culminate in a tangible employment action, such as termination
or demotion.48 If the employer can establish that it has taken reasonable
measures to remedy the harassing behavior, or that it neither "knew [n]or
should have known" about the harassment, then the employer can escape
liability.49 Notably, this divided liability regime departs from the standard
practice of holding employers vicariously liable for harms inflicted by
employees during the course of an employment relationship."0
Retaliation is addressed in a different substantive provision of Title VII,
section 704(a), which states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment
... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
45. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 16o4.11(a)
(1985)).
46. See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable
People Believe Is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 791, 796-805 (2002) (discussing in
detail the elements of proving a sexual harassment claim).
47. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
48. Note that while Ellerth dealt specifically with hostile work environment based on sex, its
holding has also been understood as applicable to race-based harassment cases. See, e.g.,
Cooper-Schut v. Visteon Auto. Sys., 361 F.3 d 421, 428 (7 th Cir. 2004) (finding no employer
liability because employer promptly investigated plaintiff's reports of racial harassment and
reminded all employees of zero-tolerance policy toward racial harassment); McGinest v.
GTE Serv. Corp., 36o F.3d 1103, 1120 (9 th Cir. 2004) (finding a material issue of fact as to
whether an employer's response to racist graffiti had been adequate).
49. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 759.
5o. See, e.g., Justin P. Smith, Note, Letting the Master Answer: Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace Afier Faragher and Burlington Industries, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1786 (1999).
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assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under this subchapter."s
The elements required to make a prima facie case for retaliation are distinct
from those required for a hostile work environment claim. In a retaliation
claim, the focus is not upon an individual's status as a member of a protected
class, but rather upon her conduct in opposing discrimination. s2 To succeed, a
plaintiff must show that she "opposed any practice made ... unlawful" or
"participated in" protected behavior, and then experienced retribution as a
result of her protected behavior." Participation in protected conduct is satisfied
by showing that a plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC, informed her
employer that she intended to file a charge, or initiated other investigations or
proceedings.14 Opposition behavior covers a wider range of activity, and
includes actions such as complaining to a supervisor or protesting a
discriminatory assignment."5 The type of activity in which a plaintiff engages is
important; it must clearly signal the plaintiff's opposition to the unlawful
employment practice, but must not be seen as unreasonably infringing upon an
employer's right to run its business without undue interference. s6 Plaintiffs
who simply refuse to perform an assignment, for instance, run the risk of being
considered insubordinate and crossing the threshold into engaging in
unreasonable behavior that is not protected under section 704(a).5 7
In addition to establishing engagement in a protected activity, most circuits
also require that the plaintiff demonstrate a good faith, reasonable belief that
the opposed practices violated Title VII.s8 The reasonable belief doctrine can be
applied to encompass behavior not actually protected under Title VII. For
instance, plaintiffs who file sexual orientation discrimination claims have been
found by some courts to be protected under section 704(a), even though Title
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
52. See generally Brake, supra note 2 (discussing retaliation as conduct-based).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
54. See 2 ARTHUR LARSON & LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMNATION § 34.03 (2d ed.
2007).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 231 (ist Cir.
1976) (discussing the need to "balance the purpose of the Act to protect persons engaging
reasonably in activities opposing sexual discrimination, against Congress' equally manifest
desire not to tie the hands of employers in the objective selection and control of personnel").
S7. See, e.g., Smith v. Tex. Dep't of Water Res., 799 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1986).
s8. 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 54, § 35.02[21][a].
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VII's substantive provision does not reach sexual orientation.5" The reasonable
belief doctrine makes it possible for a plaintiff who alleges both discrimination
and retaliation to recover for the retaliation, even if the court ultimately
determines that the discrimination claim was without merit.6°
Retaliation plaintiffs also must demonstrate that they experienced harm. In
Burlington Northern, decided in 2006, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit
split over what conduct qualifies as sufficiently adverse to sustain a cause of
action for retaliation. 61 The Court defined actionable retaliation as a "materially
adverse" action which "could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making
or supporting a charge of discrimination. '' 62 The holding thus clarified that a
plaintiff who experiences retaliatory harassment need not prove that she




Finally, the retaliation plaintiff must also demonstrate that the adverse
action ensued because of her opposition or other protected behavior. The
plaintiff can usually do this by showing that an adverse action followed soon
after she engaged in the protected activity.
64
If a plaintiff can establish the foregoing elements, she will have made a
prima facie case of unlawful retaliation. The employer then has the opportunity
sg. Martin v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 224 F. Supp. 2d 434, 448 (N.D.N.Y. 2002)
(stating that a plaintiffwho filed a sexual orientation claim could have "reasonably believed"
that sexual orientation discrimination was prohibited). But cf Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp.
& Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cit. 2ooo) (reaching the opposite result).
6o. See, e.g., Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, 141 F.3 d 1453 (iith Cit. 1998) (finding a cognizable
retaliation claim while upholding a dismissal of the harassment claim). For an argument
that the reasonable belief doctrine leads to selective and narrow interpretations of
discrimination, masks the complexity of discrimination, and imposes a "court-centric"
understanding of retaliation that "evaluates reasonableness from the perspective of judges,"
see Brake, supra note 2, at 76-104.
61. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
6z. Id. at 24o9.
63. Id. at 2412-13.
64. See 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 54, § 35.02[2] [2d] ("If the adverse action occurs within a
matter of days or hours of the employee's protected activity, the inference of retaliation is
certainly strong, and the employee will likely succeed in making out a prima facie case. On
the other hand, there are occasional cases in which only a day or two passes between the
protected activity and the adverse action, and in which the courts nonetheless have held that
the plaintiff failed to prove causation.... In other words, though there may indeed have
been a short period of time between the plaintiff's protected activity and the employer's
adverse action, if other factors are present which suggest the lack of a retaliatory motive, the
causation issue will tip in favor of the employer.").
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to rebut the claim by providing proof of a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" for the action. 6
Because of its different standard of proof, retaliation is in many ways easier
to prove than harassment. Under the retaliation framework, the claimant need
not establish that she was treated worse because of membership in any
protected category. Instead, she must show that she suffered harm for
challenging discrimination.66 The standard for proving harm from retaliation
after Burlington Northern is also substantially lower than that required for
hostile work environment claims. In hostile work environment cases, the
plaintiff must establish severe or pervasive harm, but in retaliation cases, the
plaintiff need not show either of these elements; rather, any single act can be
actionable, as long as it may have deterred a reasonable employee from
complaining.
The same remedies are available to plaintiffs under both retaliation and
harassment claims: injunctive relief, back pay, and front pay.6 7 Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, compensatory and punitive damages are also available. 6
But even though retaliation doctrine offers an alternate route to recovery,
court recognition of retaliation does not substitute for recovery under a hostile
work environment harassment claim. On the contrary, recognition of both
claims is necessary to achieve Title VII's purpose of responding to unlawful
discrimination. Relief awarded under a claim of retaliation alone makes no
substantive judgment about whether the conduct complained about was
actually discriminatory. As a result, retaliation claims fail to give employers
sufficient institutional feedback about whether discriminatory dynamics exist
within their workplace and provide less of an incentive for employers to
monitor and enforce nondiscrimination policies. Moreover, when courts fail to
recognize harassment as actionable, they leave intact social norms that tolerate,
or even fail to recognize, discriminatory practices when they occur.
65. Id. § 35.03 (discussing defendant's rebuttal burden).
66. Brake, supra note 2, at 22 ("The retaliation claimant need not establish that she was treated
worse 'as a woman,' but rather that she was penalized for challenging sexist practices.").
The retaliation standard can be easier to meet in cases in which there is no overt evidence to
indicate discriminatory intent. For instance, a member of a racial minority who experiences
harassing behavior in the form of denial of routine job assistance, abusive language, or
physical violence may have difficulty establishing that the adverse actions occurred because
of her race without explicit evidence of racial animus in the form of racially derogatory
comments. The same actions, however, would be sufficient to prove retaliation if they
followed closely after the filing of a discrimination complaint. Part II, infra, further discusses
this trend.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-5(g)(1) (2000).
68. Id. 5 iq8a(b).
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Relief under the retaliation claim alone also fails to make whole a plaintiff
who has experienced both retaliation and unlawful harassment. In addition to
the important psychological value that comes with having the experience of
discrimination validated by a court, judicial recognition of discriminatory
harassment also affects the monetary awards a plaintiff is eligible to receive.
Retaliation awards are by definition limited to conduct that occurs only after
the plaintiff "opposes" the original harassment, thereby providing no remedy
for the harassing activity that triggered the original discrimination complaint.
Recovery for retaliation alone also fails to adequately redress a plaintiff who
has experienced overlapping retaliation and harassment. In the zone of overlap,
the plaintiff has two distinct causes of action, but may use the same evidence to
support each claim. Court recognition of one claim but not the other can
potentially deny the plaintiff the opportunity to be fully compensated by
receiving damages for each injury.
Because of their substantially distinct inquiries and different burdens of
proof, joint retaliation and harassment claims have the potential to allow courts
to understand and respond to forms of exclusion that neither claim alone can
reach. When employed in concert, the claims can illuminate the
interrelationship between two substantively different ways of addressing
discrimination. Since the hostile work environment harassment analysis
focuses on whether adverse actions interfere with an employee's ability to
pursue her work because of a protected characteristic, it allows courts to redress
status-based forms of exclusion. The retaliation inquiry, which focuses on how
an employee's response to harassment affects how she is treated in the
workplace, allows courts to protect those who, through their conduct, oppose
discrimination. The two claims, used in concert, have the potential to allow
courts to recognize how these two types of behaviors - status-based
discrimination and conduct-based retaliation -can be employed in overlapping
ways to maintain and police discriminatory hierarchies.
But the realization of this potential depends on how courts understand the
doctrinal boundaries of harassment and retaliation. The next Part assesses how
courts have framed joint harassment and retaliation claims in practice.
I. TRENDS IN JUDICIAL ASSESSMENT OF HARASSMENT AND
RETALIATION CLAIMS
To assess how courts frame joint claims, I surveyed circuit court decisions
involving joint claims that have arisen since Ellerth. The survey showed that
courts unjustifiably limit the reach of joint harassment/retaliation claims by
disaggregating harassing and retaliatory behavior in a number of ways,
including considering escalated harassment that occurred after a complaint to
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be solely retaliatory, rather than both retaliatory and discriminatory;
interpreting harassment to be motivated by simple animus rather than by an
unlawful discriminatory or retaliatory purpose; and disaggregating explicitly
racialized or sexualized conduct from nonracialized or nonsexualized forms of
harassment when considering joint claims. My survey also found that courts
allowed the Ellerth affirmative defense to apply to cases of retaliatory
harassment, which limited a plaintiffs ability to recover for retaliation. Taken
together, these trends reflect an overly narrow conception of discrimination
and retaliation, and unjustifiably limit a plaintiffs ability to depict how she
experienced discriminatory workplace dynamics. They also have important
consequences for the types of damages available to plaintiffs, and on the tolling
period for each claim. This Part discusses these trends and their consequences
through three case studies.
A. Disaggregation of Hostile Work Environment from Retaliation
In Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, Judy Morris brought a claim of
harassment and retaliation against her former supervisor, Brent Likins, and her
former employer, the Oldham County Fiscal Court.6 9 Morris had worked as a
secretary within the Fiscal Court in Oldham County, Kentucky, for ten years
when Likins was hired as her supervisor. Immediately after he was hired,
Likins made crude jokes with sexual overtones, described Morris's dress as
"sexy," and once referred to her as "Hot Lips." Five months after he was hired,
he lowered his own evaluation of Morris's performance from "excellent" to
"very good." When Morris asked him about the decline, he propositioned her,
telling her to "come into his office and then after [they] were finished he would
mark [her] excellent[]. "7 Morris confronted Likins and complained to the
fiscal court county judge, John Black, who had executive authority over the
department. 7' At this meeting, she also informed Black for the first time of
Likins's history of making offensive jokes and his other behavior. Black initially
responded by writing to Likins and urging him to "work out any problems and
differences" with Morris, but then transferred Likins to the County
Courthouse when Morris persisted in her complaints. 72 Black informed Likins
69. 201 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2000).
70. Id. at 787.
71. The statements of facts in Black's appellate brief state that Morris "immediately"
complained to him after her confrontation with Likins. Final Brief of Defendants-Appellees
at 4, Morris, 201 F.3d 784 (No. 98-6117).
72. Morris, 201 F.3d at 787.
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that the transfer was best for "everyone's working environment," and ordered
him not to communicate with Morris. 73 In spite of the warning, Likins called
and visited Morris over thirty times. He also parked outside her window and
stared at her for long intervals, followed her home from work, destroyed the
television she occasionally watched at the office, and threw roofing nails on her
driveway on multiple occasions.74 As a result of this behavior, Morris
experienced anxiety attacks and left work on sick leave in May 1996,
approximately one year after she had first complained to Black.7"
Morris brought claims of sexual harassment and retaliatory harassment on
the basis of the above conduct. Both of her claims were dismissed by a district
court on a motion for summary judgment. 76 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the harassment claim, but reversed its
grant of summary judgment for the defendant on the retaliation claim.
With regard to the retaliation claim, the Sixth Circuit found that Morris
had alleged sufficient facts to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that she had
been the subject of retaliation.7 The court found that Likins's actions,
including continued visits to Morris's workplace, following her from work,
throwing roofing nails on her driveway, and other conduct, constituted "severe
or pervasive" retaliatory harassment. 78 (Although the court applied a pre-
Burlington Northern standard of requiring proof of "severe or pervasive"
retaliatory harassment, Likins's behavior would also undoubtedly satisfy the
current standard of "materially adverse" conduct under Burlington Northern.79)
As discussed in the next Section, the court also indicated that the dual liability
framework adopted in Ellerth was applicable to Morris's retaliation claim and
remanded the decision to a lower court to determine whether the employer had
established the elements of an affirmative defense. 8o
While it reversed the grant of summary judgment on retaliation, the
appeals court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the harassment claim,
finding that Morris had failed to establish "severe or pervasive" harassment on




76. Id. at 787-88.
77. Id. at 793.
78. Id.
79. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006).
8o. Morris, 201 F.3 d at 793.
81. Id. at 790.
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behavior as harassment. As a result, the court regarded the "sum total" of the
harassment to consist of Likins's "several dirty jokes," his "alleged verbal sexual
advance," his "one-time reference to plaintiff as 'Hot Lips,"' and his "isolated
comments about plaintiff's state of dress. ",8 2 The court concluded that Morris
was unable to establish "severe or pervasive" harassment or the presence of a
"tangible employment action"" on the basis of this evidence.8 4
The Sixth Circuit's determination that Morris could not meet her
evidentiary burden turned upon its decision to recognize only the precomplaint
behavior as harassment. The court denied Morris's express request to include
Likins's repeated phone calls and his other posttransfer behavior as evidence
for the hostile work environment claim. It attributed Likins's posttransfer
behavior to his "personal displeasure" and "simple belligerence" and
determined that there was no reason to think that it had been motivated
"because of sex. ', 8' As a result of its decision to consider the harassment as
having ended when Likins was transferred, the court barred the most severe
allegations from consideration when evaluating Morris's harassment claim,
thus making it substantially more difficult for her to prove "severe or
pervasive" harassment. The court offered no reasoned explanation for its
conclusion that Likins's posttransfer conduct did not occur because of sex, but
rather, summarily concluded that it would be a "mistake" to understand the
behavior as sex-based.16  Since the court readily concluded that the
precomplaint behavior was motivated by sex- the court faulted Morris only for
failing to meet the "severe or pervasive" element in regard to the earlier
behavior, not for failing to show causation because of sex8, - the court likely
understood the sexualized commentary to constitute harassment "because of
sex" and the nonsexual behavior to be motivated purely by personal
"belligerence."
The court's theory of the case seems to be that Morris experienced
harassment on the basis of her status as a woman before she reported Likins's
behavior, and experienced harassment based solely on her conduct after filing
82. Id.
83. The Sixth Circuit adopted a somewhat puzzling formulation, finding first that Morris had
not established a tangible employment action and then considering whether the conduct had
been "severe or pervasive." Id. at 789-9o. I will not discuss this issue here, as the court's
analysis on this point is ultimately not relevant to either the harassment or retaliation claim.
84. Id. at 789-91.
85. Id. at 791.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 789-91.
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the complaint. Thus, in the court's mind, the harassment and the retaliation
comprised two distinct, nonoverlapping forms of behavior.
Theorizing Morris's claim in this way is highly problematic. First, it reflects
an unsupported assumption that only sexualized forms of behavior constitute
harassment on the basis of sex. This approach to sexual harassment-what
Vicki Schultz has described as the disaggregation of conduct considered to be
sexual from other forms of gender-based exclusion- provides a highly
88misleading and incomplete portrait of sexual harassment. Schultz explains
that this type of disaggregation "serve[s] to exclude from legal understanding
many of the most common and debilitating forms of harassment faced by
women," such as deliberate interference with work, refusal to provide work
assistance, and denial of routine work-related courtesies.89 In Morris's case, the
court's focus on sexualized behavior led it to understand only sexualized
commentary as occurring "because of sex," and to understand the
nonsexualized intimidation as motivated by different impulses altogether.
But if sex-based harassment is understood broadly as motivated by the
desire to undermine an employee's ability to pursue her work because of her
status as a woman,90 then Likins's entire range of conduct can be understood
as harassment based on sex. Likins's conduct before the transfer-
inappropriately commenting on Morris's dress and insinuating that she should
perform sexual favors to improve her performance evaluation -was harassment
not because it involved sexual commentary per se, but rather because it marked
her as a subordinate and excluded her from full participation in the workplace
because of her status as a woman.9' By implying that her performance
evaluation had more to do with her willingness to perform sexual favors than
with her work performance, Likins marked Morris "as an outsider in the
workplace - de-authorized and denigrated, in her own eyes and in the eyes of
others."92 Likewise, Likins's stalking of Morris, his phone calls to her, and his
88. See Schultz, supra note 1, at 1686-87.
89. Id.; see also Beiner, supra note 46, at 8o8 (discussing similar patterns as a "divide and
conquer" approach to sexual harassment).
go. See Schultz, supra note 1, at 1755 (describing a "competence-centered" paradigm for sexual
harassment).
91. Indeed, this understanding of Likins's conduct is particularly salient when viewed in the
context of additional exclusionary behavior alleged in the appellate brief filed in the case,
though ignored by the court. According to the facts laid out in the Defendant's brief, filed by
the Fiscal Court and Judge Black, Likins commented that he would "never work under a
woman" in front of Morris and another supervisor immediately after he began work. Brief
of Defendants-Appellees at 3, Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784 (6th Cir.
2000) (No. 98-6117).
92. Siegel, supra note 41, at 22.
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other conduct after she reported him just as clearly represented attempts to
diminish Morris's status as a worker, while also punishing her for speaking out
against the discrimination.
In this situation in particular, the court had every reason to view the
ongoing harassment as sex-based, because Morris had experienced regular
exclusionary behavior perpetrated by the same individual throughout the
course of employment. Rather than positing that Likins's motivations for the
harassment shifted after she reported the harassment, the court ought to have
presumed that once she had established sex-based discrimination, the ongoing
harassment continued to be motivated by sex.
The court's reasoning is also problematic insofar as it attributed Likins's
behavior to "simple belligerence" and "personal displeasure." By attributing
Likins's motivations to these factors and then concluding that Likins was
therefore not motivated by sex-based reasons, the court depicted employees as
motivated either by belligerence or by discriminatory purposes, with no room
for these impulses to overlap. Such a depiction bears little relationship to actual
workplace dynamics. As discussed in Part I, it is true that those who speak out
about retaliation tend to be disliked by their coworkers, but such animus often
coexists with discriminatory or retaliatory impulses, particularly when
stereotypes about how a particular group member ought to behave conflict
with the individual's actual behavior. In this case, Likins's belligerence can be
understood as responsive to Morris's refusal to accept his attempt to
marginalize her as a worker. By ignoring the ways in which personal dislike can
be causally connected to discriminatory stereotypes, the court created an
unreasonably difficult burden on Morris to demonstrate that Likins's behavior
was not motivated by animosity.
Richardson v. New York State Department of Correctional Service provides
another example of problematic disaggregation of a harassment claim from a
retaliation claim. 93 While working as a clerk at a corrections facility, Cynthia
Richardson, an African American, reported ten instances of race-based
harassment over the course of three years. Her complaints included allegations
that a coworker stated in her presence that a Caucasian had "some nerve
bringing his brown-skinned wife to the party"; another coworker described
African American men as looking like "apes or baboons"; another coworker
described her as a "light-skinned nigger[]"; and two coworkers distributed a
racial joke that included the word "nigger. ''94 Richardson internally reported
93. 18o F. 3 d 426 (2d Cir. 1999).
94. Id. at 433-34. The court did not discuss the race of these coworkers or the overall racial
composition of the workforce when describing her allegations.
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these incidents as they occurred and eventually took a one-year administrative
leave due to emotional distress.95 During her leave, she filed a charge of racial
discrimination against the corrections facility with the EEOC. 96 When she
returned to work, Richardson was transferred to a different corrections facility,
where she was placed in a new, less desirable position that involved a greater
degree of contact with inmates.97 In the new facility, Richardson claimed that
she became the subject of retaliation and continued harassment, with her
coworkers disclosing her home address to prison inmates, deliberately placing
hair in her food on four occasions, putting horse manure in her parking spot,
scratching her car while it was parked in the office lot, ignoring her, and
making continuous references to her as a troublemaker who would "do
anything for money.",
8
In assessing her appeal, the Second Circuit determined that while
Richardson could arguably make a case for severe or pervasive harassment
based on race during her employment in the first facility, she could not do so in
the second facility.99 The Second Circuit also remanded the question of
whether the employer had taken reasonable measures to correct the harassing
behavior in the first facility,'00 thus leaving open the possibility of an
affirmative Ellerth defense.'
The court held that because the majority of the incidents that occurred in
the second facility-the continuous "troublemaker" comments, the scratches
on her car, the hair in her food-were not related directly to race, Richardson
failed to demonstrate that these incidents had occurred because of her race. The
court reasoned as follows:
Of the fifteen incidents about which Richardson complains, only three
have any racial overtones whatsoever, and these ... are isolated, mild,
and cannot, under any objective standard, suffice to create a hostile
working environment. Indeed, only one involves Richardson's
protected racial category. The balance may reflect that Richardson was
not liked by her [Cayuga Correctional Facility] co-workers and may be
relevant to her retaliation claim .... But to sustain a Title VII hostile
9s. Id. at 434.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 435.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 449-50.
loo. Id. at 442-43.
lo. See infra Section II.B.
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environment claim Richardson must show more-she must produce
evidence that she was discriminated against because of her race, and
this she has not done.
1 2
The court disaggregated explicitly racial comments from other conduct that the
court considered nonracial in a way that is directly analogous to the
disaggregation of explicitly sexual conduct from nonsexual conduct in sex
discrimination cases.' That is, just as the Morris court considered Likins's
sexual jokes and advances to be motivated by Morris's status as a woman,
while considering his other acts of harassment to be motivated by simple
displeasure, here the court considered the racial jokes to be motivated by
Richardson's status as an African American, while considering the other
exclusionary conduct to be motivated by different impulses. Again, this led to
the perverse result that the most severe forms of exclusion that Richardson
experienced- the sum of the behavior that took place in the second facility -
were excluded from consideration when she attempted to show "severe or
pervasive" harassment.
In Richardson, the court's summary conclusion that the harassment ceased
to be motivated by Richardson's status as an African American at the time of
her transfer is particularly disturbing because the court found the adverse
transfer itself to be a form of retaliation.10 4 By disaggregating the motives for
harassment, the court created perverse incentives for employers, who may seek
to immunize themselves from liability for discrimination by simply
transferring a plaintiff who complains into a different setting. That is, because
"severity and pervasiveness" becomes much more difficult to prove when the
harassing actions are broken into separate categories, ' employers who transfer
plaintiffs in response to harassment claims can reduce the likelihood of
liability, while doing nothing to address the behavior that led to the complaint.
While the court refused to consider the sum total of the behavior as
ongoing racial harassment, it held that Richardson had a viable retaliation
claim based on her experiences in the second facility. In addition to finding that
the transfer itself could constitute retaliatory action, the court found that
coworker harassment, if left unchecked, could constitute an "adverse action"
102. Richardson, 18o F.3d at 44o.
103. See Schultz, supra note i, at 1713-14.
104. Because Richardson's position in the new facility involved substantially more contact with
inmates, the court concluded that Richardson had been transferred to an objectively
undesirable position in a way that constituted an "adverse employment decision" in
response to her speaking out about discrimination. Richardson, 18o F.3d at 444.
10s. See Schultz, supra note i, at 1798.
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for the purposes of proving retaliation. 16 The court found that the harassment
Richardson experienced at the second facility was adverse and causally
connected to her discrimination claim because many of the incidents had
occurred shortly after deposition notices were served for her original
discrimination claim.' °7 As a result, the court denied the employer's motion for
summary judgment with respect to retaliation, even while granting summary
judgment with respect to discrimination in the second facility.
Because the court refused to consider the conduct in the second facility as
harassment, the sum total of the behavior that it considered to be potentially
discriminatory amounted to the ten racial comments made in the first facility.
The court remanded the question of whether these statements, standing alone,
constituted "severe or pervasive" harassment. However, as the court itself
acknowledged, °O such thin evidence is unlikely to support a claim for race-
based harassment when considered on the merits. In the end, the court's
reasoning left Richardson with the probable outcome of sustaining a judgment
for retaliation, but losing her claim for discrimination- a judgment that would
signal that her ongoing trials at the correctional department amounted to
nothing more than retaliation for having reported her ultimately misguided
belief in race-based discrimination09
1o6. The court defined an "adverse employment action" to apply when plaintiff "endures a
,materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.'" Richardson, 18o
F.3 d at 446 (quoting Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997)). Presumably, if this
case were decided today, the Second Circuit would apply the materially adverse standard set
out in Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412 (2006).
107. Richardson, 18o F. 3d at 446-47.
1o8. The court stated that a decision maker "may well conclude" that the incidents in the first
facility were "not so objectionable as to alter negatively the terms and conditions of a
reasonable person's employment," but refused to conclude that the evidence presented
"compels only that result." Id. at 44o.
iog. Other recent appellate cases discuss related forms of disaggregation. See, e.g., Nair v.
Nicholson, 464 F. 3d 766, 768-69 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that the plaintiff did not
experience national origin harassment because she could not provide evidence that her
coworkers directly referred to her national origin when harassing her); Phelan v. Cook
County, 463 F.3d 773, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2006) (criticizing a lower court for "split[ting] the
hostile work environment issue into two inquiries"); Freitag v. Ayers, 463 F.3d 838, 849 (9th
Cir. 2006) (considering a hostile work environment claim to include a plaintiff s allegations
that she was "repeatedly exposed to conduct of a sexual nature," but not discussing
nonsexual forms of workplace exclusion, such as plaintiffs allegations that her coworkers
undermined her authority and interfered with her work, as also potentially relevant to the
hostile work environment claim).
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B. Applying the Ellerth Affirmative Defense to Retaliation
Both Richardson and Morris also illustrate a second doctrinal move that has
unreasonably restricted the scope of the joint harassment/retaliation claim: the
application to retaliation claims of the Ellerth affirmative defense, which allows
employers to escape liability for harassment if they can prove that they neither
knew nor should have known about the harassment or that they took
reasonable remedial measures to correct the harassing behavior.1 °
In Morris, the Sixth Circuit drew an analogy between sexual harassment
and retaliatory harassment, and held that "just as an employer has the
opportunity to prove an affirmative defense to severe or pervasive sexual
harassment by a supervisor, it follows that an employer should also have the
opportunity to prove an affirmative defense to severe or pervasive retaliatory
harassment by a supervisor."' Moreover, the court held that the Ellerth dual
liability framework was applicable to all retaliation cases where the retaliatory
activity consists of harassment, thus formally modifying its standard for
proving a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. 2 The court offered no
analysis for why the defense should apply, but rather summarily concluded
that an employer is "entitled" to the affirmative defense whenever the unlawful
action consists of harassment, regardless of whether the harassment is
motivated by discriminatory purposes or by retaliatory purposes.
Likewise, in Richardson, the court reasoned that just as an employer will be
held liable for "a racially or sexually hostile work environment created by a
victim's co-workers if the employer knows about (or reasonably should know
about) that harassment" but fails to address it, "so too will an employer be held
accountable for allowing retaliatory co-worker harassment to occur if it knows
about that harassment but fails to act to stop it.""' 3 The Second Circuit offered
no reasoned analysis regarding whether or why retaliatory harassment should
be considered sufficiently analogous to discriminatory harassment so as to
justify applying the affirmative defense.
Despite the Second and the Sixth Circuit's conclusions to the contrary,
there are compelling reasons why the Ellerth affirmative defense should not
apply to cases of retaliatory harassment. First, the defense creates an
unreasonably high burden on retaliation plaintiffs continually to report
harassment to their employers. In a retaliation case, by the time a court
iio. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 769 (1998).
111. Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 792 (6th Cir. 2000).
112. Id.
113. Richardson, 18o F.3d at 446.
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examines the question of employer liability, the court must have already found
that the plaintiff experienced harm for opposing an allegedly unlawful practice.
The plaintiff must thus have already met the burden of informing her
employer at least once about an unlawful practice, either through filing a
charge with the EEOC (which courts assume gives the employer notice of the
complaint) or by engaging in oppositional conduct. Morris had put her
employer on notice by twice reporting Likins's behavior to Judge Black.
Richardson had filed both internal grievances at her workplace and a charge
with the EEOC. Only after the plaintiffs had alerted their employers to their
belief that they were being discriminatorily harassed did they claim to
experience retaliatory harassment. While the behavior they initially complained
about was arguably distinct from the behavior they experienced in their
retaliation claim, their initial reports of harassment were sufficient to put the
employer on notice that they were targets for reprisal. By allowing employers
the opportunity to assert an affirmative defense, the Sixth and Second Circuits
place a burden on potential plaintiffs to inform employers about harassment
repeatedly. The burden this creates on plaintiffs is unjustified, both because the
plaintiff has already put the employer on notice of the possibility of retaliatory
conduct, and because the costs associated with speaking out about
discrimination are so high for plaintiffs in the first instance.
'4
Moreover, as the Supreme Court recognized in Burlington Northern, in
order for Title VII to be effective, it must grant special protection to those who
speak out about discrimination. The Court in Burlington Northern reasoned
that Title VII could be read to grant retaliation plaintiffs even broader
protection than discrimination plaintiffs, and explained,
differences in the purpose of the two provisions [i.e., anti-
discrimination and anti-retaliation] remove any perceived "anomaly,"
[in granting retaliation broader protection] for they justify this
difference of interpretation .... Title VII depends for its enforcement
upon the cooperation of employees who are willing to file complaints
and act as witnesses .... Interpreting the anti-retaliation provision to
provide broad protection from retaliation helps assure the cooperation
upon which accomplishment of the Act's primary objective depends."'5
The Court's recognition of Title VII as designed to grant robust protection to
those who speak out against discrimination requires rejection of the Ellerth
affirmative defense to cases of retaliatory harassment. As the Court explained,
114. See supra Section I.A.
lis. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414 (2006).
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if fear of reprisal deters employees from reporting discrimination, then the
enforcement mechanism behind Title VII suffers as well. Making meaningful
remedies readily available to plaintiffs who can prove retaliation is one essential
way of encouraging retaliation plaintiffs to come forward to report
discrimination. Such remedies are also necessary in order for plaintiffs to find
and retain private counsel willing to represent them in the enforcement of Title
VII.
C. Court Construction of Retaliation Post-Burlington Northern
Morris and Richardson were decided before the Supreme Court issued the
Burlington Northern decision, so in theory, Burlington Northern could alter the
way that lower courts understand retaliation and lead judges to protect
reporting of retaliatory harassment. But judging from Moore v. Philadelphia,"6
one of the few post-Burlington Northern decisions that considered retaliatory
harassment, Burlington Northern is not necessarily having that effect.
The Moore plaintiffs were three white male police officers who claimed to
have experienced retaliation by their white coworkers and by their supervisor
for socializing with black officers and for objecting to racism in the
department. The Moore plaintiffs worked with black officers in a seven-person
squad assigned to a sector in Philadelphia known as the "Badlands" for its high
violent crime rate. 1 7 The plaintiffs experienced retaliation after objecting to
their supervisor's use of racially derogatory epithets and his practice of giving
the African American officers discriminatory assignments (such as assigning a
female African American officer to patrol a high-crime neighborhood alone, on
foot, on a rainy night, when the standard practice was to patrol with a partner
in a car)."' After the plaintiffs complained about the discriminatory treatment
of African American officers, their supervisor's behavior toward them
worsened; he stopped granting them routine lunch breaks, closely monitored
their behavior, and gave them undesirable assignments." 9 On one occasion, the
supervisor threatened to "make [a claimant's] life a living nightmare" if he
complained to the EEOC. 20
The plaintiffs also experienced harassment by their white coworkers. The
coworker harassment originally began as a result of socializing with black
116. 461 F.3d 331 (3d Cir. 2006).
117. Id. at 334.
118. Id. at 335.
iig. Id. at 338.
120. Id. at 337.
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officers, and then escalated when the plaintiffs filed grievances regarding racial
harassment in the workplace and other violations of officer policy. 2 ' The first
complaints made by the plaintiffs with regard to their coworkers did not
discuss harassment, but instead related how certain coworkers had violated
department policy and improperly handled a drug case." However,
subsequent complaints reported race-related antagonism and ostracism of the
black officers by the white officers.'23
Before filing complaints, the officers claimed to experience harassment in
the form of "not getting courtesy rides from other officers, not having access to
radios on their shift, [and] other officers interfering with their radio
communication ... etc.," which they attributed to their socialization with the
black officers.' 4 After the plaintiffs complained about the conduct, their
coworkers repeatedly referred to them as "rat" and "snitch," made "rat noises"
at them, and wrote graffiti on bathroom walls describing the plaintiffs as
"rats," "snitches," and "pussies."'25 The coworker exclusion escalated, and
culminated in an incident where the plaintiffs' fellow officers refused to
respond to one of their calls for backup during a shooting." 6 The Moore
plaintiffs reported the incidents of coworker harassment to their supervisor as
they occurred, and brought a claim for retaliatory harassment based on all of
the above conduct. 127
In analyzing whether the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to
survive a motion for summary judgment for their retaliation claim, the court
121. Id. at 336.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 334-35.
12S. Id. at 336.
126. Id.
127. The plaintiffs in Moore only pursued a retaliation claim, not a joint harassment and
retaliation claim. The court indicated that if the plaintiffs had brought a hostile work
environment harassment claim, it likely would have been dismissed because of their race,
but that this did not prevent them from bringing a viable retaliation claim. The court noted
that
the fact that the plaintiffs are white is not a "threshold problem" for their
retaliation claims. While white workers may be unable to successfully complain
under the antidiscrimination provision of Title VII solely because they are
required to work in an environment hostile to blacks, if they became the victims
of "materially adverse actions" because they reasonably perceived that
environment as violative of Title VII and objected, they have a valid retaliation
claim.
Id. at 342 (footnote omitted).
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broke down the plaintiffs' claims into two causes of action, and assessed the
supervisor's retaliatory actions as a distinct claim from the coworkers'
retaliatory actions. With regard to the claim against the supervisor, the court
found that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that the plaintiffs had
engaged in protected opposition conduct by speaking out against their
supervisor's racist comments, and that they had suffered an adverse action
designed to prevent them from complaining about discrimination.128 In
reaching this judgment, the court placed particular emphasis on the fact that
the supervisor had directly threatened to make the life of one of the plaintiffs a
"living nightmare" if he filed a discrimination suit.'29
Although the court found sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case
of retaliation on the part of the supervisor, it also found that the plaintiffs had
failed to prove a prima facie case of retaliatory harassment with regard to their
coworkers' behavior. The court faulted the plaintiffs for failing to provide
enough evidence to show a causal connection between speaking out about
discrimination and experiencing reprisals.'30 The court found that the
harassment could not "be reasonably linked to retaliatory animus" because the
harassment was related to their having filed complaints about their fellow
officers' handling of the drug report, rather than their race-related
complaints. 3' Moreover, the court found that even if the coworker conduct was
intended to be impermissibly retaliatory (insofar as it was intended to punish
the plaintiffs for reporting racial tensions within the department, and not to
punish them for complaining about the improper handling of the drug report),
the City of Philadelphia would not be vicariously liable for the retaliatory acts
of the coworkers because it had taken reasonable measures to address graffiti
and investigate why the plaintiffs had not received backup during the shooting
incident.'32 In this respect, the court applied traditional agency principles to
retaliatory harassment and found that an employer should only be liable for
coworker harassment if the employer was negligent with respect to discovering
or responding to the harassment."'
128. Id. at 345-46.
izg. Id. at 343.
130. Id. at 349.
131. Id. While the preceding summary of Moore is highly simplified (because the Seventh Circuit
analyzed the case of each plaintiff individually, and each plaintiff alleged distinct facts), the
overarching conclusion-denying summary judgment for the employer on the question of
supervisor retaliation but allowing it for coworker retaliation-was applied to all three
plaintiffs.
132. Id. at 350.
133. Id. at 349.
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In reaching its conclusion, the court applied the agency principles that have
been applied to coworker discriminatory harassment to retaliatory
harassment.'-' In light of Burlington Northern, however, this standard ought to
be revisited with respect to retaliatory harassment. Given the importance of
creating a liability framework that encourages retaliation plaintiffs to come
forward, as well as the Supreme Court's recognition of Title VII's broad
protection of retaliation plaintiffs, lower courts ought to reconsider the
question of whether retaliation plaintiffs should face the burden of
demonstrating employer negligence with regard to coworker conduct in order
to attach employer liability.
Another potential problem in the court's assessment of this case involves
the disaggregation of the supervisor's retaliation and the coworker's retaliatory
harassment. The court's decision to consider the retaliation by the supervisor
as being distinct from the coworker retaliation is problematic because it
prevented the court from being able to consider how the entire range of
harassing behavior could have affected the plaintiffs. By breaking the
retaliatory harassment down into two smaller claims, the court overlooked the
possibility that both forms of harassment, viewed together, could have deterred
the plaintiffs from complaining more fully than either behavior alone. Put in
the language of Burlington Northern, the disaggregation in this instance
prevented the plaintiffs from being able to demonstrate how the combined
supervisor and coworker retaliation "could well dissuade" them from filing a
claim for discrimination.13
The court's assessment of the supervisor's behavior also points to a
potentially disturbing trend to the extent that the court justified its finding of
retaliation by relying on the supervisor's statement that he would make a
plaintiff's life a "living nightmare" if he filed a complaint with the EEOC.
136
While this statement undoubtedly demonstrates an impermissible retaliatory
motive, the supervisor's other behavior -the denial of routine breaks and close
monitoring of their behavior-should also be interpreted as reflective of an
impermissible retaliatory motive. The court's assessment of retaliation in Moore
indicates that after the Burlington Northern decision, courts may look for direct,
rather than indirect, evidence of retaliatory intent similar to how some courts
currently look for evidence of direct racial or sexual epithets to show race- or
134. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760 (1998) (discussing agency principles as
applied to the employment relationship, and the "negligence" standard for coworker
harassment).
135. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (20o6).
136. Moore, 461 F.3d at 337.
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sex-based animus. Since it is fairly unusual for supervisors or other employees
to express their retaliatory motives in such a transparent way, requiring proof
in this form, if it becomes standard for demonstrating causation, could have
the potential to severely constrict the applicability of retaliation doctrine.
D. Consequences of Disaggregating Retaliation from Harassment
The discussion of the preceding cases illustrates some of the major
consequences of disaggregating retaliation from harassment. First, separating a
pattern of ongoing harassment into distinct, nonoverlapping claims of
retaliation and harassment misconstrues workplace dynamics. It depicts
harassers as motivated by only one impulse at a time and fails to allow for the
possibility that harassment can often ensue both in order to maintain a
discriminatory hierarchy and to punish the victim for challenging the
hierarchy. Disaggregation that attributes harassment solely to personal animus
also ignores how discriminatory stereotypes can inform such animus.
13 7
Second, disaggregation in the form of excluding postcomplaint conduct
from the harassment inquiry severely undermines a plaintiff's ability to prove
status-based discrimination. It places an unjustifiably high burden on the
plaintiff to show that harassment was "severe or pervasive" on the basis of only
a portion of the overall exclusionary behavior. Such disaggregation not only
unreasonably restricts the range of evidence plaintiffs can present in proving
their claim, but also fails to give sufficient institutional feedback to employers
with regard to the presence of discriminatory workplace dynamics.
Third, disaggregation of retaliation from harassment and the application of
the Ellerth affirmative defense operate to reduce employee incentives to report
discriminatory behavior. If harassment and retaliation inquiries are seen as
nonoverlapping, then the evidence available to support each claim is
diminished, which makes it less likely that a claimant can establish either claim.
A diminished likelihood of success can, in turn, discourage potential plaintiffs
from bringing claims or make it more difficult for them to find attorneys
willing to represent their claims. The Ellerth affirmative defense, which can
operate to prevent a successful retaliation plaintiff from recovering from her
employer, undermines the enforcement of Title VII for the same reasons.
137. See Schultz, supra note 1, at 176o n.407 ("There is ... a voluminous literature on the link
between a group's numerical underrepresentation (or 'token' status) in an occupation or job
and the incidence of stereotyping, discrimination, and harassment that the token group
experiences from the dominant group.").
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Disaggregation also has extremely important consequences for two other
areas: tolling and damages.
1. Tolling
To bring a timely hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that at least one of the incidents contributing to the creation of a
hostile work environment occurred within either 18o or 3oo days, depending
on whether the plaintiff has filed her claim with a nonfederal agency. Under a
"continuing violations" theory of harassment, if a plaintiff can demonstrate
that a series of events constitutes a larger hostile work environment claim, then
the relevant period begins anew for each contributing event.138 However,
events that fall outside of the hostile work environment claim cannot be used to
extend the tolling period.
To put this in more concrete terms, suppose that the pattern of events in
Morris had unfolded in this way: On days o-loo, Morris was harassed by
Likins in the original office. On day iol, she complained about his behavior to
Judge Black, resulting in Likins's transfer. On days 101-401, Likins stalked
Morris and committed other acts of retribution. On day 402, Morris filed a
claim for harassment and retaliation. If the court considered the hostile work
environment harassment claim to encompass only the set of events that
occurred prior to Morris's complaint-the events that occurred on days o-
loo-then her harassment claim would be time-barred, because it would fall
outside the requisite period. But if the entire pattern of behavior is considered
one continuous case of hostile work environment harassment, then she would
have an additional 30o days (until day 701) to file a timely charge for
harassment.
Reed v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc.'9 illustrates how this dynamic
can play out in practice. Laurie Reed, a server at Cracker Barrel, brought a suit
for retaliation and harassment against her supervisor, Kirk Hooper. Reed
alleged that from the commencement of her employment in February 1996,
Hooper harassed her by making a series of sexualized comments and jokes
around her. These comments persisted until October 1997, when she directly
confronted Hooper about his behavior and told him to stop. 14° After that point,
Hooper's behavior changed; while his sexualized commentary ceased, he began
engaging in nonsexualized forms of harassment, such as assigning her to
138. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
139. 133 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (M.D. Tenn. 2000).
140. Id. at 1o61.
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undesirable shifts, telling other employees to ignore her, and stationing her in
unpopular sections of the restaurant so that she would earn fewer tips. This
behavior continued until January 1998, when he terminated her for not
charging her brother for a drink with his meal.
141
The court found that Reed had alleged sufficient facts to establish both
claims of retaliation and harassment under Title VII and under a state
antidiscrimination statute, but found the sex harassment claim time-barred
under the state statute of limitations. The court reasoned:
[T]here are separate claims of sexual harassment and retaliation, and
there seems to be a clear demarcation where the former ended and the
latter began. For that reason, the court has examined the sexual
harassment claims as terminating with the plaintiff's confrontation of
Mr. Hooper in late October 1997. Given that approach, the plaintiff has
not shown that any acts of sexual harassment occurred within one year
prior to January 8, 1999. As a result, the plaintiff's state law claims for
quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment under the
Tennessee Human Rights Act are barred by the statute of limitations.'
42
As a result of the court's conclusion that Reed ceased to experience sex-based
harassment the day she complained to Hooper, she was barred from bringing a
harassment claim and recovering for discrimination.
2. Damages
Disaggregation of retaliation from harassment claims limits a plaintiffs
ability to collect compensatory and punitive damages, which are available for
both claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 4 1 Specifically, when courts
make the doctrinal moves illustrated in Morris, Richardson, and Reed and
consider the hostile work environment claim to end when the plaintiff speaks
out about harassment, they limit the plaintiffs ability to recover for
harassment that occurs either before or after lodging the complaint, depending
on how the court constructs each claim. In Reed, for instance, the court's tolling
of the statute of limitations for the sex harassment claim prevented Reed from
receiving any compensation- compensatory and punitive damages, as well as
attorney's fees -for the behavior that occurred prior to her confrontation with
141. Id. at 1063.
142. Id. at 1075.
143. Pub. L. No. 102-166, lO5 Stat. 1071 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
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Hooper in October 1997. Likewise, the court's decision to consider Hooper's
conduct after October 1997 as retaliation alone, rather than both harassment
and retaliation, prevented Reed from recovering under each theory of liability.
The potential for recovery under the retaliation claim alone is insufficient to
remedy the consequences of the court's disaggregation because compensatory
and punitive damages are widely understood as available in response to each
unique injury, regardless of whether or not those injuries are supported by the
same set of evidence.
Allowing the same events as evidence for purposes of proving both
harassment and retaliation will sometimes, but not always, make a difference in
the amount of recovery a plaintiff can receive. Section 1o2(b)( 3) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 caps the total amount of damages a claimant can receive
based on the employer's total number of employees. For employers with fewer
than lO workers, punitive and compensatory damages are capped at $5o,ooo;
for employers with over 5oo employees, damages are capped at $300,000.'44 If
the total amount of damages under one claim is equal to the statutory cap, then
the plaintiff will not be able to recover additional damages for overlapping
retaliation and harassment under Title VII. Jury damage awards in excess of
the Tide VII cap, however, can be allocated to state law claims and to § 1981
claims, if applicable, thus allowing a plaintiff to recover the full amount of
damages allocated by the jury.
14
But even in situations where the absolute amount that a plaintiff can
recover is limited by the cap, damages serve an important signaling function.
In Tide VII cases, juries are not instructed on the existence of statutory caps;
they make decisions about damages based on what they believe is necessary to
provide adequate redress.14 6 If the total amount of damages granted exceeds
the statutory cap, then judges adjust the amount to accord with § 1981a. But
employers learn of the original jury awards, even if they do not have to pay
them. Particularly high damage awards also sometimes circulate in the media,
144. 42 U.S.C. 5 1981a(b)(3) (2000).
145. Damages are treated as fungible where the standards of liability under Title VII and the state
law claim are the same. For instance, if a damage award exceeds $300,000 and a plaintiff has
brought claims under Title VII as well as an equivalent state statute, then $300,000 of the
damages can be awarded under Title VII, and the rest to a state law claim. See, e.g., Pavon v.
Swift Transp. Co., 192 F.3d 902, 91o (9 th Cir. 1999).
146. See Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1245-46 (loth Cir. 1999); Sasaki v. Class,
92 F.3d 232, 236 (4th Cir. 1996) (requiring a new trial for damages determination because
counsel informed the jury of statutory caps on damages).
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pressuring employers to create stronger internal mechanisms for preventing
retaliation and discrimination. 1
47
III. TOWARD REALIZING THE POTENTIAL OF THE JOINT
HARASSMENT/RETALIATION CLAIM
Despite the fact that some courts have diminished the effectiveness of joint
harassment and retaliation claims through various forms of disaggregation and
other limitations, such claims nonetheless hold enormous potential to allow
courts to respond to complex forms of workplace exclusion if they are framed
in an integrated way. The distinct legal inquiries under each claim create room
for courts to recognize ways in which status-based and conduct-based forms of
exclusion can interrelate in the workforce. Concurrent examination of the
claims thereby allows courts to recognize how individuals can simultaneously
be marginalized because of their status, as well as because of their oppositional
conduct.' 48 This Part discusses the potential of the joint claim through a case
study and outlines three doctrinal approaches that are necessary to reach an
integrated understanding of joint claims.
A. Case Study of an Integrated Claim
Valentin-Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla 49 illustrates an integrated
approach to joint harassment/retaliation claims. In that case, the court
considered claims of hostile work environment and retaliation brought by a
female police officer, Blanca Valentin-Almeyda, against her employer and
supervisor. From February 15, 1997, until January 27, 2003, Valentin-Almeyda
had worked for a municipal district in Puerto Rico, where she was supervised
for part of the time by Justo Cruz, an administrative sergeant who had
authority to impose sanctions and control work assignments.' Valentin-
Almeyda contended that Cruz began to sexually harass her in August 20oo. He
referred to her as "hot-hot-hot," told her she had "horny" eyes, and said that
147. See, e.g., Eyal Press, Family-Leave Values, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 29, 2007, at 37-38
("[C]ompanies are well aware of the negative publicity lawsuits can generate"); Heidi
Benson, Sex Harassment Prevention Classes May Be Paying Off, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 4, 20o6,
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2oo6/o9/o4/MNGIEKVoCM.DTL
(discussing increased jury awards in discrimination cases).
148. See Brake, supra note 2, at 95 & n.269 (discussing the interconnectedness of different kinds
of subordination).
149. 447 F.3d 85 (1st Cit. 2006).
iso. Id. at 89.
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her husband (who she was in the process of divorcing) did not appreciate
her.151 He also rubbed against her at work and drove by her house multiple
times a day."'2 In October 2000, Valentin-Almeyda reported the behavior to a
designated grievance officer, and attempted to meet with the Commissioner of
the department to report the harassment.'53 The Commissioner turned her
away, however, directing her to an internal affairs investigator, who, in turn,
told her that Cruz's behavior was "[her] fault because [she] had him
bedazzled. 1
54
Shortly after meeting with the investigator, Valentin-Almeyda was
transferred to a "remote" and "solitary" unit, where Cruz visited her and told
her that he could have her returned to the regular unit if she "stopped being
such a spoiled rotten kid."15 Between October 2000 and January 2001,
Valentin-Almeyda was also assigned to a number of double shifts and
continued to be harassed by Cruz, who left an intimidating note on her car and
threatened her with more undesirable work assignments."56 On February 14,
shortly after noticing Cruz stalking her and her son at a mall, she tried again to
complain to the Commissioner. On her way to the meeting, Cruz called her
and ordered her to come to the police station, where he and two other officers
kept her for several hours, wrote up admonishments against her, and
physically took a phone away from her when she tried to call a legal services
organization.' 5  The incident culminated with her having a nervous
breakdown, leaving in an ambulance, and taking an extended sick leave. 58 She
returned to work in October 2001, but then left again in January 2002 because
Cruz, the Commissioner, and one of the officers who had helped Cruz detain
her began visiting her work station one or two times a week, and these visits
left her too uncomfortable to continue working. 159 She again went on a stress-
induced medical leave and, in January 2003, filed a claim for harassment and
retaliation under Title VII, Puerto Rican antidiscrimination law, and the Due
Process Clause. 6' At the trial, the jury awarded her substantial monetary
151. Id.
152. Id. at 90.
153. Id.
154. Id. (alteration in original).
155. Id. at 9o-91.
156. Id. at 91.
157. Id. at 92.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 92-93.
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damages against the municipality and Cruz on the basis of all of the above
actions."'
The defendants appealed the verdict, arguing that Valentin-Almeyda had
not alleged sufficient facts to sustain a judgment for either harassment or
retaliation. They characterized the harassment claim as comprised solely of
Cruz's sexually explicit remarks and behavior, and argued that "any woman,
particularly a police officer, could handle them. ",162 The court rejected this
theory of the case, and instead considered the entire range of exclusionary
behavior experienced by Valentin-Almeyda as constituting harassment on the
basis of sex. The court noted that in addition to the unwanted sexual overtures,
Cruz
threatened to and did make compliance with his demands a condition
of avoiding punishment at work. He threatened Valentin that she
would be "screwed" if she would not react more affectionately to his
unwanted advances. The threat was not an empty one. He had already
163seen to it that she received unfavorable work assignments ....
The court found Cruz's entire set of behavior-his sexually explicit
remarks, his abuse of his power over work assignments, and his threats of
further retribution-relevant to the harassment inquiry. The court's analysis of
the sexual harassment claim was grounded in its implicit assumption that sex-
based harassment can take many forms, and that exclusionary behavior need
not be sexual in nature to reflect discriminatory intent. By allowing Valentin-
Almeyda to make the case that Cruz's sexual propositions, his threats to punish
her, and her transfer to an undesirable unit constituted ongoing discriminatory
harassment, the court gave Valentin-Almeyda a chance to depict how the entire
range of behavior engaged in by Cruz (and the other complicit officers) marked
161. The breakdown of the damage award was as follows:
The jury found the Municipality liable for $250,000 in compensatory damages on
the Title VII claim. The jury awarded $250,ooo against the Municipality and
$8o,ooo against Cruz individually in compensatory damages on the Law 17
[Puerto Rican antidiscrimination law] claims. Finally, the jury found the
Municipality liable for $125,000 in compensatory damages on the due process
claim. The total initial jury award was $705,00o. After the verdict, Valentin
sought and obtained reinstatement and doubling of the damages on the Law 17
claims; this doubling of the Law 17 amounts resulted in a total jury award that
just topped $i million.
Id. at 93.
162. Id. at 96.
163. Id.
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her as a subordinate, delegitimized her status as a worker, and interfered with
her ability to pursue her work because of her sex.
The court found this same pattern of behavior relevant to Valentin-
Almeyda's retaliation claim. The First Circuit found that Valentin-Almeyda
had engaged in protected activity by complaining to the Commissioner and to
the internal grievance officer and that she had experienced retaliation in the
form of adverse assignments, extra double shifts, and transfer to the remote
unit in response to her complaint.164 By recognizing these behaviors as both
retaliatory and discriminatory, the court recognized how Valentin-Almeyda's
sex and her opposition to discrimination had both functioned to make her a
target for harassment.
The court's approach to the case allowed it to recognize retaliatory
harassment and hostile work environment harassment as dynamically
interrelating to create heightened forms of exclusionary treatment. It
understood the escalating harassment as motivated not only by retaliatory
purposes, but also by a normative belief on the part of Cruz and others that
Valentin-Almeyda ought to tolerate the behavior rather than speak out against
it. The grievance officer's comment, for instance, that the harassment was
"her" fault because she had Cruz "bedazzled" 6 ' expresses a motive similar to
that of the supervisor in Slack v. Havens who claimed that "[c]olored people
should stay in their places. ''166 In both instances, underlying assumptions
about how members of a particular group ought to behave affected how their
opposition to discrimination was viewed in the workplace. By recognizing this
fact, the court also recognized how Valentin-Almeyda became subject to
harassment not only because of her status as a woman, but because of her
status as a woman who sought to confront discrimination.
B. Recommendations for Reaching an Integrated Understanding ofJoint Claims
There are several steps, some of which are illustrated in Valentin-Almeyda,
that courts can take to reach an integrated understanding of joint hostile work
environment/retaliation claims. First, courts should allow the same evidence to
count for purposes of proving harassment and retaliation. This doctrinal move
164. Id. at 97 ("The jury could easily regard the totality of these assignments, following swiftly
on the heels of her complaints, as well as the disciplinary letters, as adverse employment
actions caused by Valentin's complaints.").
165. Id. at 90.
166. 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 885, 887 (S.D. Cal. 1973), affd as modified, 522 F.2d 1o91 (9th
Cir. 1975).
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is necessary to allow plaintiffs to depict fully the exclusionary dynamics that
often exist within a workplace. Only by allowing the same evidence to count
for both claims will courts be able to recognize and respond to the reality that
status-based discrimination is often intimately related to employee conduct,
and that assertive responses to discrimination can incur a backlash in the form
of escalated discrimination as well as retaliation.
Applying the same evidence to multiple claims within a single case is not a
new development in Title VII. To the contrary, courts often allow the same
evidence to be used in claims of disparate treatment and retaliation, as well as
in other types of joint claims.167 Likewise, the same statistical evidence often
supports both claims of disparate impact and disparate treatment. 68 As courts
have recognized in these types of cases, plaintiffs often cannot adequately
portray exclusionary workplace dynamics unless they are allowed to present the
same evidence in multiple claims. Allowing evidence of retaliation to apply also
toward discrimination is particularly important in joint harassment and
retaliation claims, because otherwise, the tolling period bars plaintiffs from
even having the opportunity to litigate their discrimination claim. In Valentin-
Almeyda's case, for instance, if the court had considered harassment to consist
only of the conduct that occurred before she initially complained about Cruz's
behavior, then her discriminatory harassment claims almost certainly would
have been time-barred, resulting not only in reduced damage awards, but also
in the court's failure to recognize the discriminatory dynamics at work in the
police department.
Second, in cases where plaintiffs report the existence of harassment both
before and after they file a complaint or otherwise report discrimination, courts
should adopt a rebuttable presumption that harassment occurring after the
complaint constitutes a continuation of the original hostile work environment.
The presumption should be particularly robust if the harassing behavior has
been perpetrated by the same individuals. Thus, in the Morris case, the court
should have presumed that Likins's posttransfer harassment of Morris was
motivated by sex, because it had found his precomplaint conduct to be sex-
based. The employer could have rebutted the presumption by providing
167. See, e.g., McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) (allowing evidence of
failure to promote to count toward disparate treatment and retaliation); Chungchi Che v.
Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31 (xst Cir. 2003) (allowing evidence that plaintiff was
called a "chink" and subjected to excessive discipline to count for the purposes of proving
both disparate treatment and retaliation).
168. Statistics comparing employee composition to that of the relevant labor market are used in
both disparate treatment and disparate impact cases. For further discussion, see 1 LARSON &
LARSON, supra note 54, 5 9.04; and 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 54, § 22.02.
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evidence that the ongoing harassment was motivated by nondiscriminatory
purposes, but, notably, the burden to rebut the presumption would have been
the employer's. The rebuttable presumption is important in allowing courts to
recognize the reality that those who perpetrate their harassment are unlikely to
shift their motivations for the harassment completely once the target of the
harassment reports the behavior. It would also serve an important function by
not requiring a plaintiff to show twice-both before and after filing a
complaint -that harassment occurred because of a protected characteristic.
On a related note, in cases where harassment ensues or escalates after a
complaint is filed, courts should import the "motivating factor" standard of
liability employed in disparate treatment cases under section 107 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.169 Section 107 provides that "an unlawful employment
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.
17
In disparate treatment cases, this means that an employee succeeds in a
discrimination claim if she can show that an employment decision was even
partially motivated by discriminatory purposes, even if other,
nondiscriminatory motivations were also at work. If applied to joint
harassment/retaliation claims, in practical terms, the section 107 standard
would hold an employer who discriminates to any degree liable, even if the
employer could demonstrate that a particular plaintiff was also targeted
because she was disliked or regarded as a "troublemaker" or "complainer."
Section 107 also allows an employer to limit its liability to declaratory and
injunctive relief and attorneys fees (and avoid liability for damages) if it can
show that it would have made the same decision with respect to the employee
in the absence of the discriminatory motive.17' The same decision test allows
courts to signal that discrimination in any degree is unacceptable in the
workplace, but avoids the prospect of punishing employers for decisions that
would have been made anyway, regardless of the discrimination. Taken
together, the motivating factor analysis and the "same decision test" would
allow courts to apply familiar analytical tools to joint harassment and
retaliation claims and to respond more effectively to the complex and
overlapping motivations that can often inform workplace exclusion.
To illustrate how these suggestions would function in practice, consider
how Richardson would have been litigated had the court adopted the rebuttable
169. 42 U.S.C. S 200oe-2(m) (2000).
170. Id.
171. Id. S 2oooe-5(g)(2)(B).
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presumption and motivating factor analysis. In Richardson, once the court
determined that the plaintiff had experienced race-based harassment in the
first facility, it would have presumed that the harassment that occurred after
she was transferred was also race-based. The corrections facility would then
have had an opportunity to rebut this presumption and offer evidence to show
that the behavior was motivated by reasons unrelated to race. The employer
could have attempted to rebut such a presumption, for example, by discussing
and comparing the racial composition of the second workforce with that of the
first (i.e., by arguing that the workforce in the second facility was more racially
integrated and thus it was unlikely that the harassment was motivated by
racially discriminatory purposes), or by attempting to show that there was little
interaction between the employees in the two facilities. By offering various
forms of evidence, the employer could have attempted to make the case that
Richardson's status as an African American played no motivating role in her
harassment in the second facility. Notably, under this analysis, the employer's
ability to offer proof that personal dislike contributed to the harassment would
not be relevant to the court's liability determination. Rather, the threshold
question for the court would have been whether discriminatory motivations
played any motivating role in the harassment. By applying this framework, the
court would have more systematically considered whether and to what degree
discriminatory dynamics were at work in the second facility, rather than
summarily concluding that the presence of personal animus precluded
discrimination.
In broader terms, the adoption of the rebuttable presumption of ongoing
discrimination and the "motivating factor" standard of liability is one way of
allowing courts to recognize and respond to conduct that occurs at the
intersection of harassment and retaliation. As the social science studies
discussed in Part I reveal, racism and sexism are often closely related to
retaliation, and, likewise, those who report harassment tend to be disliked by
their fellow coworkers and supervisors for complaining. Indeed, that dislike
and personal animus may actually be evidence of underlying sexism and/or
racism, insofar as it is motivated by a belief that members of a certain group
should not step above their stations and speak out about discrimination.
Adopting the presumption that harassment which initially arises from
discrimination continues to be motivated by discrimination comports with the
practical reality that discriminatory motivations are not likely to disappear once
the target of discrimination speaks out.
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Finally, the third doctrinal move that is necessary to reach an integrated
understanding of harassment/retaliation is that the affirmative Ellerth7 2
defense should not be applied to cases of retaliatory harassment. The
affirmative defense should not be applied for the reasons the Court gave in
Burlington Northern: the vitality of the Title VII regime depends on the
willingness of individuals to come forward and report harassment, and if
courts fail to sufficiently protect these individuals from retaliation, then they
risk undermining the effectiveness of the antidiscrimination regime itself.
73
The promise of holding employers financially accountable for the consequences
of retaliation is necessary to encourage plaintiffs to come forward with
retaliation complaints, to allow them to find counsel willing to represent their
claims, and to create incentives for employers to monitor workplaces more
closely and prevent retaliation from occurring.
These recommendations constitute the minimal changes necessary for
courts to respond effectively to joint claims of retaliation and harassment.
While these changes are far from sufficient to resolve all of the doctrinal
inconsistencies in judicial understandings of joint harassment and retaliation,
they provide a basic framework from which courts can begin to consider the
overlapping nature of the claims. By considering how worker status and
conduct interrelate in the workplace, courts can begin to engage in the broader
task of responding to dynamic forms of workplace exclusion.
CONCLUSION
Hostile work environment harassment doctrine and retaliation doctrine
hold enormous potential to redress intersectional forms of exclusion in the
workplace. Within Title VII, they are the two doctrines that arguably confer on
courts the greatest flexibility in recognizing and responding to unlawful
employment practices. Hostile work environment harassment doctrine invites
courts to look beyond the content of any individual act of harassment and
consider how a series of harassing events -some of which may seem small or
relatively innocuous in and of themselves-can create an unlawfully
discriminatory environment. Retaliation doctrine invites courts to consider
how various forms of exclusion may have deterred an individual from speaking
out about behavior that she considers to be discriminatory. Both of these
doctrines implicitly allow courts to recognize and respond to the fact that
172. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
173. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414 (2006).
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conduct-based and status-based exclusion, respectively, can take a number of
different dimensions.
Yet in order to fully realize the potential of both of these doctrines, courts
must recognize how the joint application of harassment and retaliation can
reinforce and police discriminatory hierarchies more thoroughly than either
behavior alone. In light of the growing rate at which retaliation has been
reported in the workplace and given an increasing body of social science
research suggesting that retaliation often occurs alongside harassment and
other forms of discrimination, it is essential that courts adopt rules that allow
them to recognize how retaliation can amplify the effects of harassment, while
simultaneously deterring individuals from reporting it. Only by developing
doctrines that recognize and respond to retaliation and harassment occurring
in concert will courts be able to further the goal of defending those who would
speak out about discrimination and uphold Title VII's mission of protecting
those most likely to be relegated to the margins of the workplace.
